

**LOCAL GOVERNANCE APPROACH TO
SOCIAL REINTEGRATION AND
ECONOMIC RECOVERY IN
POST - CONFLICT COUNTRIES :**

THE VIEW FROM MOZAMBIQUE

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INTRODUCTION

The author worked in Mozambique between 1991 and 2001 and was Chief Technical Advisor of the UNCDF District Planning and Financing Project referred to in this paper.

Although Mozambique's 16-year long civil war ground to an exhausted halt in 1992 the writing was already on the wall by the 1990 when agreements with the IMF and donors were anticipating a ceasefire¹ and the end of apartheid finally removed the last justification for continued armed hostilities.

Beginning with the National Reconstruction Plan of 1991-1992 there has been a gradual decentralisation of financial resources and a growing awareness of the territorial aspects of resource allocation. Likewise there has been continued inching towards political decentralisation and devolution of power.

One of these positive developments was the district planning movement, which developed a model that is being hesitatingly adopted by government.² The objective of

the model was to show that power could be devolved to non-elected district governments in a way that legitimised the state at the local level. Thus creating a win-win situation in which on the one hand state institutions are strengthened and on the other hand a gradual process of democratisation can begin that attempts to deal with issues through the local state rather than challenge the legitimacy of it.

The snails pace of these reforms has been in part due to the continued stand off between the former belligerents on the ground. Whilst a de-facto peace exists, a stable social settlement has yet to emerge and large parts of the country perceive themselves to be disenfranchised from power and influence. History has shown that in such circumstances violent conflict can reoccur after long intervals.³

In fact recently, both the political and financial aspects of reform seem to have stalled, if not exactly gone into reverse, reflecting a renewed hesitancy following the initial enthusiasm.⁴

The peace settlement gave Mozambique the trappings of western style institutions, leading some to classify the country as a liberal democracy.⁵ The international aid community needed an African success story and Mozambique duly obliged, leading to what some have described as a conspiracy of silence over deep-rooted corruption and social exclusion.⁶

This paper suggests that it is at the level of the local state and particularly the local space and not at the level of national institutions that the true condition of Mozambique's peace settlement is apparent and it is at this level that social reintegration is an essential part of preventing future conflicts.

The immediate postcolonial project of the African state was nation building.⁷ Ethnic and regional constituencies were marginalized in place of loyalty to the motherland.⁸ However this attempt at nation building produced exclusive and monolithic states that centred power on certain clans and cliques. A plurality of power centres within the state was seen as threatening to national coherence. In many African countries this post-colonial settlement has managed to survive various free elections whilst maintaining large minorities effectively disenfranchised from the political process and from power itself, the Ndebeles in Zimbabwe are a good example.⁹

However maybe experience is demonstrating that the emphasis in state building should be on the local state, thus enabling social inclusion and a plurality of power and influence. The fear that this threatens national cohesion is misplaced and recent research points to the importance of a powerful and confident central state as a prerequisite for successful decentralisation.¹⁰

In Mozambique there are two models of local governance. Firstly, the urban municipalities comprising a new autonomous constitutionally defined state structure

located outside the national planning and budgeting system. Secondly, the district planning movement based on a model pioneered in Nampula province that attempts to reform and democratise the non-elected rural governance structure from within.

This paper will examine the district planning model and the insights it produced regarding social reintegration, post conflict reconciliation and their relationship to the local state. The paper will highlight the strategy followed by the district planning model, examine some of the lessons for donors and aid agencies and speculate on why, following initial enthusiasm, the government is hesitant on full implementation of the model.

1. THE BACKGROUND TO THE DISTRICT PLANNING MODEL

1.1 War and peace

An understanding of the potential role of local governance to post conflict recovery in any specific circumstance can only begin from an appreciation of the nature of the conflict itself.

In 1974 Following a decade long guerrilla war the Mozambican National Liberation Front (FRELIMO) negotiated an independence settlement with Portugal. The Portuguese fought hard to keep hold of their colonies, which were a valuable source of revenue and settled by a considerable number of Portuguese citizens. The colonial army suffered heavy losses that induced soul searching about the future direction of the Portuguese state. In a dramatic move, young army officers seized power from the autocratic regime. They maintained a vision of a democratic Portugal embedded in Europe and were inspired by the radical ideas of the day and the growth of the European Common Market (now European Union). Following their seizure of power they rapidly negotiated independence deals with the five African colonies and washed their hands of responsibility for the aftermath.¹¹

For FRELIMO the rapid exodus of almost all Portuguese citizens exacerbated the shock of a sudden assumption of the reins of power. The Portuguese system shared some of the characteristics of the apartheid model in which whites were reserved jobs down to levels such as engine drivers, mechanics and hospital nurses. Africans were not allowed to obtain an education above 4th grade unless they attained the status of “*assimilado*”¹².

This dramatic loss of all skilled personnel combined with the introduction of a command economy had catastrophic effects. The arrival of western European and Eastern bloc experts could never replace the 500,000 civil servants, businesspeople and technicians who had left, yet the new system required more not less technical expertise.

The sudden success of FRELIMO in attaining power led to a further problem of

legitimacy and inclusion. During the independence struggle the guerrillas were largely drawn from the northern Christian Maconde tribe and the intelligentsia from the southern Shangana and Ronga ethnic groups, also largely Christian. Vast swathes of the country, and in particular the populous central provinces of Zambezia, Sofala and Manica were barely involved in the struggle. Some of these regions then suffered hardest the negative consequences of post independence policies.

The Indian Ocean port of Beira, Mozambique's second city is a case in point. Beira's wealth stems from its position at the end of the rail line leading into the hinterland through Zimbabwe and as far as Zambia's copper belt. One of the first actions of the FRELIMO government was to apply the UN sanctions regime against the then illegal government of Ian Smith in what was Rhodesia. This move was applauded by SADAC and the British Government and led to an anomalous military alliance between Margaret Thatcher and Samora Machel.¹³

However this move paralysed the economic life of Beira.¹⁴ For the population of that city independence became synonymous with economic hardship. This caused resentment, which was fuelled by the arrival of governors and technicians of the new ruling bureaucracy and technocracy largely drawn from the southern Shangana and Ronga tribes. The new political system provided for a form of popular neighbourhood council to channel concerns and execute local tasks. However this did not amount to either a local state or a plural system of power and therefore did not provide an effective enfranchisement of the Beira population or link them to centres of power and influence.

Some local army officers who felt particularly disaffected left FRELIMO in disgust. One of them, Andre Matsanguissa was contacted by Rhodesian intelligence, keen to exploit any opportunity to strike back at their newly independent neighbour. The Mozambique National Resistance, (RENAMO) was born.¹⁵ At first RENAMO's actions were closely coordinated by their external masters, who were losing the war against ZANU and ZAPU, and provided little threat to the government. Following the independence of the Zimbabwe in 1980, RENAMO could have withered and died.

However the Botha government in apartheid South Africa took up their sponsorship and from 1981 RENAMO began to expand rapidly. By 1987 they were active in every province, had paralysed road transport, halted the rural economy and reduced the country to a series of "islands" connected by air.¹⁶

How were RENAMO able to be so effective? The supply of weapons and expertise from South Africa helped, as did their uncompromising terror, but the geography of the war tells a story. Without feelings of disenfranchisement and disaffection amongst certain groups it is arguable whether they would have been so successful.¹⁷ These groups can be divided up as follows:

- The Christian and Islamic faiths, which were sidelined by the initial revolutionary ideology

- The wholesale and warehousing network, that was accused of hoarding and price fixing and replaced by state run retail distribution systems
- Some tribal and ethnic groups who felt marginalized and disfavoured in access to jobs and resources
- Some farmers opposed to the collectivisation of agriculture
- Local traditional authorities, the clan based rural leadership system, which was incorporated into the Portuguese governance system though never completely dominated by it. In many areas this structure represents the centuries old local governance system, yet it was seen as obsolete by the idealists and modernisers in FRELIMO.¹⁸

Since the economic and social reforms of the late 1980s many of these groupings have come back into the fold. Established churches are now thriving with the greatest threat not from the state but from their evangelical rivals. The retail and wholesale industries are enjoying a boom satisfying the growing urban consumer demand. However, in rural areas significant numbers still harbour grudges.

1.2 The 1992 Rome peace agreement

By 1987 the ruling elite realised that they could not win the war and that the economy had collapsed. The government drew up its own economic reform programme and didn't seek a standard IMF recipe, though they ended up joining the IMF in 1994. At the same time they initiated serious overtures to the opposition. From this moment the "peace process" had begun.¹⁹ Coming prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union and before any sign of weakening in neighbouring South Africa this was a far sighted decision.

What motivated this choice? Probably a combination of the public and private interest. On the one hand, as a nationalist movement who's members had sacrificed much for the independence of the country, there was a genuine patriotic realisation that things were rock bottom and needed to change. On the other hand, without some economic reform and growth, any possible privileges, which they enjoyed or hoped to enjoy, were being eroded. In 1987 only the very top of the ruling political and economic elite could be said to be living comfortably. Certainly, many wasted no time in taking advantage of the opportunities opened up by the change in direction.

The installation of a parliamentary system was part of the UN brokered settlement between the government and the rebels. The consolidation of this deal was achieved by buying out the RENAMO leadership.²⁰ Not a difficult task given their lack of real political agenda and the fall of their political masters in South Africa.

Donors underwrote the peace process. All national and local elections, including the next ones, are donor financed, together with almost anything else that moves or squeaks. Whilst in absolute terms the aid flows may not be that great, the golden rule that aid should not subsidise consumption has been broken in Mozambique.²¹ The state is too weak to reproduce itself and fulfil its constitutional obligations on its own.²²

Interestingly, some observers classify Mozambique as a liberal democracy.²³ This classification may have been made on the basis of the 1994 elections, and the anarchic freedom resulting from a very weak state apparatus. Until recently, relative to the region²⁴ Mozambique has enjoyed a free press and a flowering of civil society organisations.²⁵ However these freedoms have begun to recede and the legal and criminal justice system has fallen into complete disrepute. In conclusion, Mozambique has the external appearance of a liberal democracy, but shows a different reality beneath the surface.

1.3 Peace, or pieces of peace?

The idea of a peace settlement implies a move to a new reality defined by consensus and legitimised by all partners. Such an overriding new social settlement was not put in place by the 1992 agreement. Rather we have partial understandings and truces, some more contentious than others, in a number of areas of the national polity.

One of these is between the government and the international community. This understanding requires that Mozambique subscribe to the prevailing orthodoxy with regard to its macro economic policy and its public sector reform. There are two elements to this deal, both of which reflect the contemporary menu on “good” governance and “good” public management:

- The government must pursue “pro-poor” policies through a Poverty Reduction Strategy, a reform of the public financial management system, a medium term expenditure strategy and common logframes with donors for pooled budget support to sectors (the sector programmes or SWAPs).²⁶
- The government must create an enabling environment for economic growth. The criminal justice system and legal system must function, principally to provide a legal underpinning to commercial activity and foreign investment.²⁷

Another understanding is the one between the government and the urban intelligentsia and civil society. This requires that Mozambique maintain a free press, an open secular society and a socially progressive outlook. These civil society groupings represent those in the social democratic and socialist traditions who supported FRELIMO through the independence struggle and the civil war and who formed a large part of the first government and technocracy. Recently this alliance has begun to fall apart in the wake of the assassinations of independent journalist Carlos Cardoso and economist Siba Siba

Macuacua who were investigating the extensive frauds connected with the privatisation of the banking sector and the disappearance of over 200 million dollars, obliging the treasury to re-capitalise the banks.²⁸

A third settlement is between the government and the RENAMO leadership. This is based on the privileges enjoyed by the leader of the opposition and his parliamentary deputies. RENAMO, whilst enjoying large popular support, has failed to transform itself into a root and branch political party. Indicative of this has been the weakness of the opposition with regard to the series of financial scandals and the collapse of the criminal justice system and the catastrophe in Montepuez in November 2000 in which 100 RENAMO supporters died in police custody.²⁹ Despite these events no effective opposition is evident.

For the central government, their legitimacy depends on these “peaces” remaining in place. The international community, the urban civil society and RENAMO leadership represent the constituency to whom they respond. All operate at the level of Maputo. What is happening out in the countryside where the majority of the population live is a different question.

1.4 Rural peace and the legitimacy gap

In the rural districts amongst the populace at large a sharp cleavage exists between those areas comprised of populations supportive of the FRELIMO party and involved in the liberation movements and those where the population is made up of members of the disenfranchised groups referred to in section 1.1 above. In the former, whilst disgruntled people exist, the district government is seen as a legitimate institution of civic governance. In the latter, the district government has a severe legitimacy problem and is tolerated though not always recognised or obeyed by the population.

The government has recognised this problem and since the peace agreement has made moves to address it. Nevertheless the demographics of the voting patterns in two successive general elections show that there is still a long way to go.

The cold shoulder given to the traditional structures of rural leadership has been recognised as a mistake, in 2000 the government passed a decree recognising this traditional leadership, providing them with some perks and responsibilities. Studies have shown that these structures constitute the real governance system, a parallel local state if you like, in some rural areas.³⁰

This is the rural environment in which the UNCDF Project was working. Before moving on to consider this Project and its role in post conflict reintegration a brief appreciation of decentralisation and the local state is necessary.

2 DECENTRALISATION AND THE LOCAL STATE

2.1 Political decentralisation

Mozambique is a unitary state divided into 10 provinces and 128 districts. The state structure comprises two levels of subordination and accountability, technical and political. On the technical level central ministries and agencies have provincial representations. This pattern is repeated in the districts, which have offices subordinate to their respective provincial agency.

With regard to political control, each national agency reports to the prime minister and ultimately the president. At provincial level the president appoints governors as representatives of the central state, to whom provincial line agencies are politically subordinate. The same structure is repeated in the districts where the provincial governor appoints administrators as representative of the state, responsible for political leadership in the district. This system has three salient features,

- It is a system of dual subordination with each local institution accountable to both their organisational hierarchy and their local political boss.
- All accountability is upward. Every institution and figure represents a higher authority and none is downwardly accountable to the citizen, user, consumer or local institution.
- It is not integrated territorially. The previous two features mean that whilst there is a collective known as the district or provincial government, it does not operate as an integrated territorial unit. There are no proposals to decentralise this structure but there have been proposals to de-concentrate powers and to merge some of the territorial representations of line agencies into thematic groupings.³¹

Members of Parliament are chosen by provincial electoral circuits but do not specifically represent that province in parliament and are accountable through their party to the electorate as a whole and not any particular province or region.

In 1994, on the basis of the peace agreement, a proposal was aired for the election of district mayors and assemblies and the effective transformation of districts into municipalities. The enabling legislation was introduced in Parliament amid a donor-funded flurry of consultancies and conferences.³² However the government withdrew the measure claiming a lack of capacity at local level and instead an alternative package was introduced that allowed for municipal elected government in 33 cities and towns. The first elections took place in 1999. If the word reform is taken to mean a change in institutional and power relations, then the municipal experience is of the few real decentralisation reforms since the peace agreement.

2.2 Financial and fiscal decentralisation

Strictly speaking the only true fiscal decentralisation is with regard to the municipalities. These structures lie outside the all-embracing state budget (OE).³³ The municipalities have tax raising powers and enjoy significant autonomy over their financial affairs. Tutelage is exercised by the Ministry of Planning and Finance and the Administrative Tribunal but is concerned with accounting and legal questions and does not intrude on policy.

With regard to the provinces and districts all expenditure is accounted for under the OE. Until the early 1990's neither territorial entity was a budgetary unit, income and expenditure could be found under the provincial or district components of the respective line agency budget headings. The territorial divisions of the MPF collect most taxes and fees, although the district administrator's department and some line agencies also collect revenue. Whilst all revenue is on budget (or should be) there are formulae in place permitting retention of a percentage by the local institution.

In 1994 the MPF experimented with a block investment grant to the provincial governments to be distributed amongst the line agencies and district administrator's departments. The Provincial Directorates of Planning and Finance were responsible for the technical direction of this work under the political supervision of the governor. This was a significant move and resulted in many interesting experiments. A UNDP project supported this activity at provincial and central level, producing methodologies for provincial annual planning and budgeting. Gradually, increasing responsibilities were transferred to provincial level including management and procurement for some national capital programmes.

With regard to capital expenditure, this decentralisation went into reverse with the inception of the sector programmes from 1998. Under these mechanisms donors and ministries pooled resources around a commonly agreed logframe. This resulted in the local activities of those institutions being planned and budgeted centrally and in some cases the re-centralisation of activities such the management and procurement referred to above.

However it was from this experiment in provincial planning and budgeting that the district planning experience was born. Inspired by the initiative of some provinces transferring resources directly to districts, the MPF commissioned a study about the potential role of districts in the planning and budgeting system.³⁴ On the basis of this study national guidelines were produced for District Development Plans that saw the districts as integral units for planning and budgeting (and implicitly though not explicitly) governance.³⁵ The guidelines allowed for the creation of consultative forums, without legal powers but providing an interface with civil society with respect to district plans and budgets.

In 1998 the government decided to test the district planning guidelines in Nampula

province prior to possible introduction of the district as a budget unit and as a full part of the national planning and budgeting system. A pre-existing UNCDF project was chosen as a vehicle for this and joint financing with the Netherlands's government was agreed. The project began work in January 1998. The objective was to use the Local Development Fund³⁶ format to pilot financial transfers to districts from the province, thus experimenting with the district as a budgetary unit for capital expenditure.

3 THE UNCDF PROJECT AND POST CONFLICT REINTEGRATION

3.1 Nampula province, its districts and the UNCDF Project

Nampula province is situated in the north of the country and has a population of three million inhabitants divided into 18 districts (with a mean population of approx 150,000 each) and 4 municipalities. Whilst largely populated by the Macua tribe, its party allegiances are split 50/50 making it an interesting case study of the phenomenon of social inclusion and exclusion explored in this paper. The mainly Muslim areas towards the coast are predominantly RENAMO supporting whilst the Christian areas further inland tend towards FRELIMO.

The province chose to begin the experiment in some districts with a large degree of RENAMO support. It was clear from the beginning that the whole question hinged on legitimacy.

- Firstly, how can the transfer be designed in such a way that the district receives it as its own legitimate funding? Thereby fulfilling the demands of the experiment and giving it leverage to restore its legitimacy amongst the population.
- Secondly, what are the consequences of piloting a financial transfer to a district government if that body is not recognised as legitimate by the population and latent post conflict mistrust is high? In particular, how does this approach work in a post conflict environment in which government legitimacy and capacity is low and many agencies prefer to work outside the government directly with the “poorest of the poor”?

The project tried to answer these questions. With regard to the first question a solution lay in the innovative insertion of the project at provincial level.

3.2 Capacity strengthening

Recent research points to decentralisation to a local level of the state being most effective when in the context of a strong and supportive superior state hierarchy. This is in contrast to the “bottom up” approach to decentralisation, which can appear to be

strengthening the local state at the expense of superior levels. This is often thwarted by the level perceived to be losing out who see it as a challenge to their power and hegemony. However in cases where decentralisation is seen as a win-win situation the top can create an enabling environment for the bottom.³⁷ This involves the top defining its role as strategic and parameter setting. Power and resources are then decentralised within those parameters and strategy. The role of the top is then one of support, training and supervision. This philosophy can be applied at all levels of any organisation.³⁸

Nampula province was chosen to test out the district planning guidelines because it had already begun to apply these ideas with its own provincial investment budget. The UNCDF funds were injected into the provincial treasury to continue and expand this policy. This created the challenge of building capacity at provincial level to perform this role of support and supervision.

Capacity can be analysed in a variety of ways.

- Cultural capacity refers to the norms, attitudes and habits of a society or institution and the relationship of these to the tasks in question.
- Political capacity – the political will and resolve to handle the consequences of any reform or change
- Technical capacity to absorb and assimilate the ability and knowledge to execute the tasks being proposed
- Legal capacity refers to the legal and procedural framework for executing the proposed reform. Are the roles and relationships expected of each institution sufficiently clarified by law and do they fall within their remit?
- Material capacity – the existence of the physical means to carry out the reform

The project worked at provincial level across all these fields to build provincial capacity to support the districts. However the way in which this work was carried out was of utmost importance. The provincial staff and institutions had to be the interlocutors of the districts. Staff were trained as trainers to the districts and a comprehensive pedagogic methodology was developed. This capacity building effort is described in a separate paper.³⁹

The project as such was not to have a public face at district or provincial level. The idea was to avoid a “Project Implementation Unit” that “decides” things and instead take each respective government institution and put it to work in implementing the annual cycle of planning and budgeting with respect to provincial responsibilities to the districts. This

involved putting institutions in touch with each other, attributing them with genuine responsibility and power within the process and creating a web of connections between district and provincial levels that either put existing legislation to work or showed up gaps in institutional relations. The project itself has no tangible existence and there is no room for arbitrary largesse or appeals to an omnipotent project co-ordinator.

This approach can be seen as a way of cranking up a rusty motor until it splutters into life, viewing the external funds as a way of fuelling the motor. Sticking with this analogy it is vital neither to flood the engine nor to rev it up too much. The various components themselves must do the work at a pace that reflects their capacity. In the context of a post-conflict state this approach allows weakened institutions to find their feet and restore their self-confidence

The consequence of this approach was a project less flexible than some and less able to respond immediately to donor requirements. It involved devolving real power to the respective institutions and therefore risking delays and changes to externally stipulated methodologies. Yet it was essential that this approach be adopted given the legitimacy problem and the danger of capacity weakening explored in the next section.

3.3 Capacity weakening

As referred to above, both the nature of the experiment and the post-conflict environment required that the district government and civil society perceived the capital grant as an inter- governmental transfer and not a “project activity”. Why was this so important?

When the Nampula pilot started emergency programmes were still operating in some districts. In addition to these activities a plethora of rural development, health and education projects were taking root. Many of these involved “participation” of the rural population as a fundamental part of their activities. Quite often this approach involved the creation of community groups and other bodies as counterparts of the development projects. In the context of rural Nampula the creation of such groups was problematic.

In counterpoint to the decline of local government legitimacy, is the continuation of a resilient rural society, which has survived colonialism, communism, war and peace with some of its leadership structures remarkably intact. In the first general election there were documented cases of conferences of elders to decide which way the village should vote.⁴⁰

It is in this environment that the development agencies were operating. Many of these bring with them a certain conception of civil society and governance that can lead to a dismissive approach towards the both the district government and the local traditional structures. These bodies are seen as not accountable to or representative of the “community”. In the absence of “accountable” bodies the projects look around for

partners. Finding none that conform to the sort of civil society structure required, they conclude that civil society in Mozambique doesn't exist and proceed to create it.⁴¹

Yet it can be argued that civil society structures in western countries are a response to the atomised citizen and both a product of and prerequisite for a capitalist liberal democracy. In Britain and the United States the disappearance of rural peasant social relations occurred very early and civil society has a long history. However in the rural areas of Nampula the atomisation of society has not yet taken place. In this respect, the state at local level deals not only with individual citizens and but also with legitimate representatives of clans and families.

So one way of capacity weakening at local level is for the "project" to avoid working with the existing social and government structures and to replace them with alien bodies that cannot survive and reproduce themselves without external support.⁴²

There is another way in which local indigenous capacity can be weakened. Working with the poorest of the poor is the approach used by many.⁴³ This often involves the use of the type of PRA methodology pioneered by Robert Chambers.⁴⁴ This has become a mantra for some who forget its origin as a participatory research tool and not a direct programming methodology. If handled badly it can further weaken government legitimacy whilst disempowering the community.

What happens is that following various intensive and time consuming participatory exercises with people deemed to be sufficiently poor; a decision is made about something to be done. This invariably involves the spending of money and the continued participation by the beneficiaries. It is quiet clear where the money has come from, and at the end of the process there is often some sort of formal thanks to the providers. This process raises a number of questions:

- Extensive participation is often a prerequisite, yet the poorest of the poor are extremely busy people. In advanced liberal democracies people who are seeking something extra, after selling their labour, and who have the time to do so often practise such participation. In the context of Mozambique, where that "extra" is already there in the rural society structures. Is this participation sustainable? Or, as in the words of one local farmer is participation the punishment for being poor.
- The government's role in this is negligible, yet it is the government who will often have to maintain and incorporate any infrastructure or service into its system. The population have not been empowered to dialogue with or pressure this government, or trained in how to get the best from it. Is there any onus on the government to pay any attention to what happened? And will the population's response be any other than to hope for a return of the original providers?

So rather than learn how to behave and relate to their own institutional environment the

community becomes skilled in behaving and performing in ways necessary to access resources from projects. This is a self-fulfilling cycle, when the community accesses project resources the project is evaluated positively and more resources become available.

Some agencies tried to remedy this problem by working with the district government. This creates a different disempowerment in which district governments learn how to dialogue with and access agency funds but not how to dialogue and bargain within their own institutional setting with other levels of government. Nor do they learn how to relate and respond to community pressure.

In both these scenarios what is missing is a conception of the local state and a local polity. There is not too much politics at district level, on the contrary there is too little. Real empowerment would involve kick starting a political process at district level in which the district government felt the heat of community pressure and the community knew how to turn the heat up.

This is what legitimising the local state means. Not allowing it to act with impunity but placing it in a local polity, or political and economic space, and making it the accepted forum for decisions affecting that space. This explains why it was necessary for the Nampula model to avoid being perceived as a “project” if it was to fulfil its role as an experiment and to help cement a local polity as part of post conflict recovery.

However one question remains; How is it possible to establish a local polity and local politics without re-establishing armed conflict? Which is, after all, only “politics by other means” in Lenin’s famous phrase. The next section examines the methodology followed in Nampula.

3.4 Legitimising the local state - the district governance model

As part of the survey of the districts and their communities the provincial and district government staff, trained by the project, applied some of the PRA tools.⁴⁵ One, known as the “historical chronology”, yielded some very interesting results.

Under this method the community elders are invited to list in chronological order the main events known to the community. Many begin with the Genesis chapter of the Bible, others with the arrival of the Macua in Nampula as part of the Bantu migrations. The elders then proceed to map out all other notable events. The discussions as to what constitutes a notable event are fascinating to behold.

In many communities the list includes factors such as particularly good harvests, crop plagues, droughts and notable local social and religious events. Conspicuous by its absence is any mention of the independence movement. The first time FRELIMO gets a

mention is in relation to a negative event such as pressure on the churches or the introduction of a disliked policy affecting rural life. Whilst in these same communities some coercive aspects of colonialism might also get a mention, FRELIMO is not seen as a liberating force. These communities are the disenfranchised and socially excluded for which the district government is not a legitimate body.

Other villages, on the other hand, paint a very different picture. For them the historical chronology is replete with references to the key moments of national politics, pre and post independence. For these communities, irrespective of how disgruntled they may be, the district government is seen as a legitimate institution of local governance.

The district planning guidelines mentioned consultative forums as a way of beginning a local polity. A strategy was adopted for these forums to avoid polarisation on party grounds. The district administrator would initiate the process inviting as wide a range of legitimate local leaders and groups as possible. Generally speaking this would involve the clan leadership structure, the churches of all faiths, RENAMO and FRELIMO and other more classical civil society groupings. International agencies were also invited.

The administrator would explain to the sceptical audience that they were called together to begin a genuine exercise in district governance in which all actors would open up and recognise each other. An “Interest Group” methodology was deployed to stimulate this. Following the plenary presentation, in which most people were too timid to speak, the meeting would break up into interest groups to discuss the response. One interest group would be comprised of political parties, which obliged RENAMO and FRELIMO to return with a common message to the plenary. Another group would be made up of religious denominations including the Christians and the Muslims and so on.

Did this work? The results were mixed. Perhaps the clearest success in post conflict reintegration came in Muecate district. Following the Consultative Council meeting one of the main local chiefs was interviewed. He testified that until the meeting he had been instructing the community not to get involved with the state at any level. He was awaiting reprisals from FRELIMO in revenge for the communities support for the opposition. For him the peace agreement was no more than an interval in a conflict that could begin again at any moment. However he said he had changed his mind since the meeting. Everybody was involved and respected each other. He now pledged to instruct the community to get involved and said that he himself would try to make this council work.

The clearest failure was in Mogincual district. There very few people turned up for the meeting and those that did believed it was a “project” type activity and were looking to get something out of it. When the traditional leadership found out that the meeting was under the auspices of the district government and not an international agency they stormed out, demanding payment for travel expenses and subsistence for the wasted journey. The other community representatives followed in solidarity and the event ended in acrimony and chaos.

This example of failure illustrated the effect of the large number of emergency and development projects in Mogincual. One international agency practice particularly disempowering of the local polity is to pay people to attend meetings. As district governance bodies the Consultative Councils did not do this and some suffered as a consequence. Nevertheless, farsighted districts dipped into the budget of the administrators department, slaughtered some cattle, and invited the participants to a barbecue following the meeting. Whether or not a district administrator was prepared to do such a thing proved a good indicator of eventual success or failure.

Where this methodology was a success, the Consultative Council soon discussed issues such as who is entitled to call a meeting, who decides the invitation list, how often they should meet, who is representing whom, etc. The process of the district government and the community sitting down alone, discussing and resolving these issues is synonymous with the birth of a legitimate local polity.

3.5 Strategic planning and the local state

What did the consultative councils discuss? As stated above it was important that the financial transfer to the district was seen in the context of all other district activity and that the Councils were not there to decide solely how a project spends its money. The guidelines being piloted were for strategic District Development Plans. The MPF study had identified the lack of strategic planning at district level as a weakness that needed to be addressed. The Consultative Council was given the responsibility of defining the district development strategy and providing leadership in its execution.

Rather than deciding whether to build a health post here or a school there the Council analysed the deeper questions: – What sort of district do we want? How do we want the district to look in five, ten years? What are the structural factors holding this district back? What are the potential engines of growth in this district? And finally, how can we get from here to there?

These are strategic questions, which don't easily fit into the annual or operational planning process. They need to be looked at by the district government together with civil society. The resulting district development plan provides a strategic vision for the district that orientates the annual, or "operational" planning process.

Strategies don't contain set amounts of resources or specific actions. Their implementation includes spending money, but also lobbying, coercion, persuasion, changing the way existing resources are used and cleverly using whatever new resources appear to further the strategic objectives however possible.

These are not easy concepts to grasp but experience shows that once taken up they help a district define its own room for manoeuvre, its own sense of self and thus sow the seeds of a genuine district political space. This process can be compared to an

adolescent becoming aware of an ever-increasing degree of autonomy and responsibility. This approach is slow by nature because it requires a true local ownership of the process. If you are driving the car it is up to you how fast you drive.

These district strategies were embodied in a District Development Plan which had the following features:

- It is **territorial** in that it covers the whole territory of the district including outlying areas and it considers the actions of all agents within the district. This encourages the district government to think of the district as a territorial unit rather than a collection of institutions.
- It is **multisectoral** and looks at **themes** rather than sector institutions and sector responsibilities. E.g. the theme of health involves education, water and agriculture as well as the health ministry itself. The plan develops these links.
- It favours a **local dialogue** between the government and civil society. This dialogue starts at a local (**horizontal**) level and looks for local solutions first, before provincial ones.
- It is **strategic**. The focus is on a long-term vision of a development scenario with thematic and territorial priorities. By necessity this excludes some areas and includes others. The plan distinguishes between routine activities and those extra activities towards realising the vision. The plan is not about infrastructure projects or listing activities but about sequencing and co-ordinating the intervention of all agents around a strategic goal.
- It is **realistic**. Nothing can appear in the plan without a realistic explanation of how it will be achieved.

This approach explicitly assumes an interventionist local state actively engaged in trying to alter its socio-economic reality. It can be contrasted with approaches that view the local state not as a local polity but as a managerial unit representing the optimum level for provision of infrastructure and services. For this contrasting view the strategy is either superfluous or is a purely technical exercise related to the “best” phasing and sequencing of actions.

In order for the model to succeed, the province needed to share this view of the active district and not feel threatened by it. The argument was that given extensive poverty these district strategies do not contradict provincial poverty reduction and economic development policies but rather provide a localised manifestation of them. The province and the district operate in different dimensions with different levels of responsibility and do not impinge on one another. The adherence of the provincial governor to this view was crucial.

3.6 The three elements of the district planning model summarised

- **District Development Plan.** A process orientated plan that provides a strategic vision for the district. This vision is expressed in thematic and territorial terms with a five-year horizon. The plan is the vehicle for the district development.
- **The Annual Planning and Governance Cycle.** The engine, which represents all the actions of district governance and civil society participation. Not just a bricks and mortar project cycle, but the complete cycle of annual planning and governance actions in execution of the plan.
- **The Dialogue with civil society.** The emphasis here is on the word dialogue. Not a case of just asking what people want and then delivering it but an attempt to engage in a long-term conversation. This dialogue and the resulting actions of civil society and the district government represent the driver of the vehicle including the accelerator and brake pedals.

The diagram in annex illustrates how the three activities link together in the district planning process.

4 ENTHUSIASM AND HESITANCY IN NATIONAL APPLICATION

4.1 Government enthusiasm

The initial enthusiasm for this model was manifest. The province received a stream of visits from high-ranking officials and ministers and evidence filtered to the capital of the efficacy of the approach. This culminated in a presentation of the model to a national meeting of all district administrators in mid 2000 when the prime minister commended the approach to his assembled subordinates.

A further boost arrived two months later when the Council of Ministers decided to meet outside the capital for the first time since independence. The venue was Angoche, a Nampula district strongly supportive of RENAMO and scene of violent conflict earlier in the year. The only item on the agenda was the district development plan methodology and how it can help to cement legitimacy and peace in such districts. Ministers pledged their support for proposals in the Angoche strategic plan. The president and his confidantes spent many hours in closed talks with the traditional clan leadership of the district – an acknowledgement of their power and influence.

During the same year the government invited the World Bank provide financing for a mainstreaming of the model involving a national programme for district planning and financing (and implicitly governance). The Nampula model was seen as a way of

opening up a district political space, building local state legitimacy without the need for elections and the municipal route.

4.2 Government hesitancy

Part of the preparation for this mainstreaming involves new legislation on the local state bodies providing legal recognition for the Consultative Councils and the enabling laws to allow for the districts to become budgetary units. This has yet to be forthcoming.

Whilst the MPF appears keen to move ahead on the inclusion of the district into the national planning system there seems to be some hesitancy from the Ministry of State Administration regarding the Consultative Councils. In addition emphasis is swinging away from the strategic approach to a more operational philosophy in which the districts are seen either as an efficient level for the implementation actions agreed elsewhere or as agents for infrastructure and service provision but not as local political spaces.

It remains to be seen whether this hesitancy reflects genuine cold feet or a desire to wait until after the next elections before advancing with real reform of the political process at district level.

4.3 The World Bank approach

In meantime, and reflecting this hesitancy, the preparatory work for the World Bank intervention has retreated from a national strategy in which a bank loan is available nationwide to a project in four provinces financing district level investment from a provincial fund.

It has been proposed that government produce a national manual, informing district administrations how to carry out participatory exercises with the population. This falls short of the setting up of a genuine representative local body with institutional memory. One would hope that this manual does not substitute for the policy goal of local representative organs.

The issue is not whether the district administrator carries out PRA exercises to decide what to build where, rather it is whether there is a willingness to foster a local polity at district level and reduce political exclusion in the context of nation building and conflict avoidance.

5 TOWARDS A THEORY OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC REINTEGRATION AND THE LOCAL STATE

What would such a theory look like? The final section of this paper represents a modest

attempt to explore this.

There is a rich literature on the theory on the Local State in which the State is not seen to be a monolithic block but a collection of overlapping and superimposed polities, each representing a pole of power and influence and all in constant tension. In particular the territorially local state has always had an antagonistic relationship with its central counterpart.


However, whilst constantly bemoaned as stifling by central governments finding resistance to their plans, this plurality of powers performs a useful function. The local state is not just an efficient level for the provision of central services but it is a political entity and safety valve allowing expression of local power and identity. Without it pressure for inclusion and expression can build up with explosive consequences. It was the reduction of autonomy in Kosovo that sparked the independence movement whereas post Franco Spain successfully granted significant autonomy to the Basque region, taking the wind from the sails of the separatist movement.

In Britain in the 1970s Cockburn and a group of social reformers known as the London-Edinburgh group developed the approach of “In and against the State.” Under this model the state can be reformed from within particularly at local level. By influencing and controlling the local state it is possible to counter a central hegemony of ideas with local ones.⁴⁶

For example some local authorities moved to provide effectively free public transport; countering the conventional wisdom that this simply wasn't possible. The positive economic effects were also noted.⁴⁷ Faced with this challenge to its ruling assumptions the central government responded vigorously, in this instance by abolishing the tier of local government responsible.

However maybe the local state rather than the central state should be the starting point for nation building. Local hegemonies can be constructed showing alternative ways of dealing with problems and providing a stable base on which to reconstruct central structures.

Tendler and others have shown that successful decentralisations require confident and powerful upper tiers of government to foster and support those below. Seeing the local state as a route to nation building is not against the interests of the centre. Rather it presents the opportunity for a win-win situation. Perhaps the key is to build leaderships in post conflict countries who feel strong and secure enough to recognise this.



6 ENDNOTES

¹ Agreements like the *Programa da Reabilitação Urbana*, a World Bank financed programme of urban recovery designed in the late 80s and running in the early 90s, clearly anticipated the coming peace. A partial ceasefire covering the Beira and Limpopo road and rail corridors was signed in Rome over 18 months prior to the eventual peace agreement. This allowed for rehabilitation of the Beira-Zimbabwe highway even as hostilities continued. Whilst the belligerents were able to cross this corridor at will they were not allowed to engage one another within three kilometres either side of the road and rail lines. *Agreement on a partial ceasefire* Sant Egidio, Rome, 1990 (text online at <http://incore.hq.unu.edu/cds/agreements/pdf/moz2.pdf>)

² Ministry of State Administration, Draft *Lei dos Órgãos Locais* (Law of Local State Bodies), Maputo, 2002

³ Mark Mazower, Europe, *The Dark Continent*, Penguin Books, 1999. This book explores how fragile and contemporary the notion of “Democracy” is and how the various States in Europe have contained latent conflicts based on identity and expression. The Balkans and in particular the former Yugoslavia are a case in point. Indonesia, another collection of identities ruled by one particular grouping, could be seen to be another example.

⁴ Whilst the Ministry of Planning and Finance is still keen to see the district installed as a budgetary unit the Ministry of State Administration seems to be reluctant to institute in law the district assembly or council to which the local budget would be accountable. Without such a body it is difficult to justify the extension of the planning and budgeting system to district level. The evidence for this contention lies in the text of the draft *Local State Bodies* law (see 2 above)

⁵ David Potter, et al (eds) *Democratization* (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1997)

⁶ Joseph Hanlon, *Are donors to Mozambique promoting corruption?*, Paper presented to conference – “Towards a new political economy of development” University of Sheffield, UK, 2002. The concerns presented in this paper had also been aired by different people at the conference *Constraints and Perspectives for Democracy in Mozambique* Organised by the Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa, in the Hague, February 2002. At this event Alice Mabota, President of the Mozambique League for Human Rights made an impassioned appeal for donors not to forget growing corruption in national ministries in their haste to develop programmes of budget support. In a dialogue with the Netherlands’ Ambassador to Mozambique it was argued that donor support for decentralised funding should not be ignored as a way of placing resources at a level that helps monitoring of their use.

⁷ Tawana Kupe, *Comment: New Forms of Cultural Identity in an African Society*, Media and the Transition of Collective Identities. Ed. Tore Slatta. Oslo: University of Oslo, 1996. This excellent paper describes this process on a continent wide scale.

⁸ Samora Machel, *Strategy of the Independence Struggle*, a speech to the Moscow Institute of Sciences in 1974 is a good example of the application of this nation building philosophy during the independence struggle. In this speech he outlines how it is necessary for people to think of themselves as Mozambicans first in order to unite and defeat the occupying power. Indeed it could be argued that the nature of the colonial occupation necessitated this approach.

(With hindsight, perhaps the mistake lay not in adopting this approach to gain independence but in rigidly maintaining it once power was attained – DJ)

⁹ Legal Resources Foundation (LRF) and the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP), *Breaking the Silence, Building True Peace, A report on the disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands - 1980 – 1989*, Harare, Zimbabwe. This paper reports on the difficulties of maintaining a unified independence movement given a lack of trust between the Shona and the Ndebele. The paper then documents the violence that followed independence during which the hegemony of the Shona based Zanu was established as part of the “nation building” process.

¹⁰ Judith Tendler, *Good Government in the Tropics*, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998. This book outlines case studies from North Eastern Brazil that show how political support and supervision from higher levels is a fundamental part of the enabling environment for successful initiatives in decentralised management and public sector reform.

¹¹ Jorge Jardim, *Episódios da Minha Missão em África*, (Episodes of my African mission), Braga, 1995. Many Portuguese had questionable loyalty to their government and there was a significant movement of settlers who favoured some sort of Unilateral Declaration of Independence, following the example of Ian Smith in neighbouring Rhodesia. Portugal heavily populated Mozambique with unskilled and semi-skilled settlers. They soon realised that there was no demand for their services in a majority ruled state and were fearful of potential reprisals from FRELIMO.

¹² Samuel Aarão Reis *Tire seu sorriso do caminho, deixe eu passar com a minha dor* (remove your happy smile, let me by with my pain). *Afirma Revista Negra Online*, Brazil, 2002. In an analysis of different manifestations of racism in the Lusophone cultural space this author eloquently describes the nature of the assimilado. In order to achieve this status Africans would have to pass a whole series of cultural and bureaucratic tests ranging from eating with a knife and fork to attaining a certain degree of financial autonomy of professional status. Once granted the coveted assimilado identity card one is then considered an adopted European. The author describes churches in which the pews are laid out into sections for whites, Indians and Africans. An African or Indian assimilado was allowed to pray to God alongside his white colleagues and separated from the milieu from which he had risen. Failing to do so might prejudice the retention of the assimilado status.

(An important distinction in this respect is between this system and the apartheid system in neighbouring South Africa, which did not have such an escape route. Many of the first FRELIMO government were assimilados and this culture continues in the bureaucracy to this day. In part this helps to explain the estrangement between the traditional leadership in the countryside and the first post independence governments. This estrangement was further cemented by the fact that under the prevailing Leninist ideology the peasantry and their customs represented a “backward” social class that would disappear under the socialist transformation of agriculture. – DJ)

¹³ Iain Christie *Machel of Mozambique*. Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1988. This biography of Samora Machel describes in detail his relationships with Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan.

¹⁴ Bruce Bartlett, *Whats wrong with Trade Sanctions?*, Cato Policy Analysis No. 64, 1985. The author quotes a work by Hufbauer and Schott that estimates the cost to the Mozambican economy of maintaining the sanctions as \$100 million per year. Bruce Bartlett is a member of the Heritage Foundation and argues against sanctions on free trade grounds. Whether this estimate is correct is difficult to assess but it is certain that the majority of impact of the sanctions regime fell on the central region. At independence Mozambique’s economy was not integrated and each region depended more on its links with the hinterland than with the rest of Mozambique. The scale of the impact of the sanctions regime on Beira can be judged by the fact that Zambia was obliged, with Chinese help, to construct a new railway to Dar Es Salaam in Tanzania solely for the purpose of avoiding the movement of its copper through Rhodesia to Beira, once Rhodesia became Zimbabwe not all of this lost trade returned to the port. See entry on Zambia in the *Colombia Encyclopaedia*, 2001

¹⁵ The fact that RENAMO was launched to the world under its English acronym MNR (Mozambique National Resistance speaks volumes about its genesis.

¹⁶ The author of this paper was one of the first people to drive by road from Beira to Maputo following the peace accord. The journey included stretches of road that had been closed to traffic for 15 years.

¹⁷ Alex Vines, *Renamo: Terrorism in Mozambique*, James Currey, London 1991. This book describes how RENAMO combined extensive rural terror with representation of a motley array of groups unhappy with the government to extend its control across the country.

¹⁸ To some extent these debates involved Africanists and Europeanists within FRELIMO. Many from an assimilado background accepted the western socialist view of the peasantry and rural society as being inherently backward.

¹⁹ Malyn Newitt: *A History of Mozambique*. London 1995 describes this process.

²⁰ This has been documented in the Mozambican press. During the peace process a Trust Fund was set up to channel donor funding for the opposition parties. Delays in the negotiations were often more related to material conditions than political issues.

²¹ John Weeks and Chris Cramer, Background Paper for Human Development Report for Mozambique 1988. London (SOAS) 1998

²² Hanlon *Who Calls the Shots*, James Currey, London, 1991. This book documents the way in which international development institutions influenced Mozambique's post war recovery and subsidised the development of its institutions. This process has continued in the decade since the book was written, cementing some of the phenomena described in this paper.

²³ Potter op cit

²⁴ The Mozambican press speculates that the armed forces were not sent to Lesotho in 1998 or to Congo in 1999 due to their complete depletion and decapitalisation.

²⁵ UNDP Mozambique Human Development Report, Maputo 1998 reports in relatively favourable terms the status of (urban) Civil Society at that time.

²⁶ Overseas Development Institute working paper 142 *The Status of Sector Wide Approaches* London 2000 and working paper 140 *New Approaches to Development Co-operation: What can we Learn from Experience with Implementing Sector Wide Approaches?* Discuss in detail this movement towards the sector wide approach and its links to PRSP and “pro-poor” budgeting

²⁷ David Dollar *Assessing Aid, what works*, World Bank, 1998. The basic argument of this report is that aid can best support economic growth where there is a certain set of policies in place to underpin economic activity.

²⁸ Joseph Hanlon *Killing the goose that laid the golden eggs*, Metical magazine, Maputo, Mozambique 1991. A series of articles documenting the banking scandal and its link to those in power.

²⁹ Human Right Watch, *World Report, Africa Overview 2002* Notes that this massacre taints the image of Mozambique as a success story. Interestingly it also reports the critical but consensual report of a parliamentary investigative commission made up of FRELIMO and RENAMO deputies. This tame response from the RENAMO leadership is in marked contrast with the response from certain sections of the population, who did not fail to notice that the death of over 100 members of the opposition party in a police cell didn't merit the resignation of a single government official.

³⁰ Baptista Lundin & Rufino Alfane. *Traditional Structures and the process of decentralisation*. For FAO Maputo, 1999. This and other reports document with attention and subtlety the patchwork quilt of varied, location specific social relations that is rural Mozambique

³¹ *Law of Local State Bodies*, op cit

³² Einar Braathen, *Democratic Decentralisation in Mozambique*, Conference on Lusophone Africa, Kings College London, 2002. See also Andrea Oppenheimer Mozambique, *The permanent entrenchment of democratic minimalism*, African Security Review, Vol 10 (1) 2001

³³ Legislation governing public finance states that the country has one budget, which must take account of all receipts and expenditure grouped into various budget headings. The argument about whether or not the districts become a budgetary unit does not affect this basic fact, they will still be encompassed in the overall state budget. Only the municipalities lie outside this structure and are constitutionally empowered to have their own budget and collect their own receipts.

³⁴ *Estudo dos Planos Distritais* (District Planning Study), Ministry of Planning and Finance, Maputo 1997

³⁵ *Planos Distritais de Desenvolvimento, Orientações* (District Development Plans, Guidelines) Ministry of State Administration and Ministry of Planning and Finance, Maputo 1998

³⁶ Leonardo Romeo, *Local Development Funds*, United Nations Capital Development Fund, 1996. This booklet outlines the basic LDF philosophy as an intergovernmental fiscal transfer for capital expenditure to lower levels of the territorial state hierarchy in combination with local governance reforms. This approach has been applied in various places and is reviewed in the background papers the UNCDF document *Taking Risks* published in 1999

³⁷ Judith Tendler op cit

³⁸ Richard Heeks (ed), *Reinventing Government in the Information Age*, Routledge, London 2001. This book brings information technology and management system thinking to a government context in both developed and developing countries.

³⁹ David Jackson & Domingos Lambo, *Institutional capacity building for District Planning. Experiences and Challenges*, International Conference on Capacity Building for Local Government, Maputo, Mozambique 2002, sponsored by Ministry of State Administration and Swiss Development Cooperation

⁴⁰ These examples come out of the author's experience as technical advisor to the District Planning and Financing Project, Nampula, Mozambique 1998 - 2001.

⁴¹ An example of the allegation that civil society doesn't exist is seen in the Back to the Office report of Jenna Lucha, Senior Technical Adviser for Participation to the United Nations Capital Development fund, following a technical visit to Nampula province in 1996.

⁴² In Nampula province various international NGOs founded local counterparts with varying degrees of success.

⁴³ Alan Tomas, *Non Governmental Organisations and the Limits to Empowerment*, in *Development Policy and Public Action*, OUP, 1992

⁴⁴ Robert Chambers, *Putting the Last First*, and other publications by the same author. This Participatory Rural Appraisal approach was born as a research tool and has borrowed techniques from various disciplines. It has bequeathed a large following and journals such as *RRA notes* published by the International Institute for Environment and Development in London. This is a methodology of collective and active information gathering using games, exercises and open-ended conversations using the vernacular. The objective is to extract qualitative data that a standard survey would fail to collect. In action research and other applications it also involves sharing that data with the participants and perhaps defining a further agenda. However, the practice has metamorphosed from an information gathering and sharing exercise to a direct programming tool. Most rural development and local planning manuals include a sequence of such exercises followed by some sort of vote as to what should happen next.

⁴⁵ The Nampula project disaggregated the PRA into its component parts. Each exercise was taken at face value and applied by government staff as and when relevant. The local polity was reconstituted and programming decisions involved wider consultations than a village exercise alone. The fact that government staff were carrying out the techniques as part of the process of governance altered the whole nature of the event because everyone was aware that there wasn't a pot of money lurking in the background awaiting the voting exercise to decide how it would be spent. In this particular example the historical chronology exercise was very useful in indicating the nature of a particular community. For more information on this approach see [Nampula project progress reports 4 & 5](#)

⁴⁶ Cynthia Cockburn *The Local State: management of cities & people* Pluto Press, 1977. This approach involves an understanding of the Gramscian concept of hegemony under which control of populations not applied by force but by establishing a hegemony that sets limits for what is understood to be possible and achievable. A local state can challenge and change this hegemony in a local space, thus gradually transforming the state from within.

⁴⁷ David Blunkett and Keith Jackson, *Democracy in Crisis: The Town Halls Respond* London, Hogarth Press 1987. This book documents examples of local states following specific local policies and attempts to show the economic benefits and political consequences.